Investigación
La agenda de investigación de la Unidad de Análisis Empresarial tiene como objetivo entender cómo el ambiente de los negocios afecta las operaciones de las empresas en los países en desarrollo. Las Encuestas de Empresas sirven como el principal insumo, complementadas con encuestas de empresas similares y otras fuentes de datos relevantes. Aquí se presentan enlaces a los documentos de investigación más recientes.Estos documentos se encuentran disponibles sólo en inglés a menos que se indique lo contrario.
Competition and Demographics in Large Indian Cities New!
Author: Mohammad Amin
Source: The World Bank, November 2007
Between 1991 and 2001, the number of adult non-workers per household showed a secular decline in most parts of India. The decline was as sharp as 18.6 percent in the state of Haryana, 12.7 percent in Kerala and 12.6 percent in Punjab. The paper estimates the likely effect of these changes on market competition using micro data on retail stores in India. Specifically, we find a strong effect of adult non-workers per household on the level of competition. A move from the 25th percentile to the lowest value of adult non-workers per household lowers the proportion of stores facing significant competition in the city by 16.6 percentage points, a large effect given that only 38.2 percent of the stores in the sample face significant competition. We provide additional evidence which suggests that our findings are consistent with the broader literature on search cost and competition. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, November 2007
Between 1991 and 2001, the number of adult non-workers per household showed a secular decline in most parts of India. The decline was as sharp as 18.6 percent in the state of Haryana, 12.7 percent in Kerala and 12.6 percent in Punjab. The paper estimates the likely effect of these changes on market competition using micro data on retail stores in India. Specifically, we find a strong effect of adult non-workers per household on the level of competition. A move from the 25th percentile to the lowest value of adult non-workers per household lowers the proportion of stores facing significant competition in the city by 16.6 percentage points, a large effect given that only 38.2 percent of the stores in the sample face significant competition. We provide additional evidence which suggests that our findings are consistent with the broader literature on search cost and competition. Full document. Slide summary.
The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms New!
Authors: Alvaro González, J. Ernesto López-Córdova and Elio E. Valladares
Source: The World Bank, September 2007
The authors measure the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, the analysis shows that perceptions adjust slowly to firms’ experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. The authors then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes relative to firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, the graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, September 2007
The authors measure the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, the analysis shows that perceptions adjust slowly to firms’ experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. The authors then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes relative to firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, the graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America. Full document. Slide summary.
Who Fears Competition from Informal Firms? Evidence from Latin America
Authors: Alvaro Gonzalez and Francesca Lamanna
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
This paper investigates who is most affected by informal competition and how regulation and enforcement affect the extent and nature of this competition. Using newly-collected enterprise data for 6,466 manufacturing formal firms across 14 countries in Latin America, the authors show that formal firms affected by head-to-head competition with informal firms largely resemble them. They are small credit constrained, underutilize their productive capacity, serve smaller customers, and are in markets with low entry costs. In countries where the government is effective and business regulations onerous, formal firms in industries characterized by low costs to entry feel the sting of informal competition more than in other business environments. Finally, the analysis finds that in an economy with relatively onerous tax regulations and a government that poorly enforces its tax code, the percentage of firms adversely affected by informal competition will be reduced from 38.8 to 37.7 percent when the government increases enforcement to cover all firms. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
This paper investigates who is most affected by informal competition and how regulation and enforcement affect the extent and nature of this competition. Using newly-collected enterprise data for 6,466 manufacturing formal firms across 14 countries in Latin America, the authors show that formal firms affected by head-to-head competition with informal firms largely resemble them. They are small credit constrained, underutilize their productive capacity, serve smaller customers, and are in markets with low entry costs. In countries where the government is effective and business regulations onerous, formal firms in industries characterized by low costs to entry feel the sting of informal competition more than in other business environments. Finally, the analysis finds that in an economy with relatively onerous tax regulations and a government that poorly enforces its tax code, the percentage of firms adversely affected by informal competition will be reduced from 38.8 to 37.7 percent when the government increases enforcement to cover all firms. Full document. Slide summary.
Financial Development and Innovation in Small Firms
Authors: Siddharth Sharma
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
Firm level data from a cross-section of 57 countries is used to study how financial development affects innovation in small firms. The author finds that relative to large firms in the same industry, R\&D spending by small firms is more likely and sizable in countries at higher levels of financial development. The estimates imply that among firms doing R\&D in a country like Romania, which is at the 20th percentile of financial development, a 1 standard deviation decrease in firm size is associated with a decrease of 0.7 standard deviations in R\&D spending. In contrast, this decrease is only 0.2 standard deviations in a country like South Africa, which is at the 80th percentile of the distribution of financial development. Small firms also report producing more innovations per unit R\&D spending than large firms, and this gap is narrower in countries at higher levels of financial development. As a robustness check, the author shows that these patterns are stronger in industries inherently more reliant on external finance. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
Firm level data from a cross-section of 57 countries is used to study how financial development affects innovation in small firms. The author finds that relative to large firms in the same industry, R\&D spending by small firms is more likely and sizable in countries at higher levels of financial development. The estimates imply that among firms doing R\&D in a country like Romania, which is at the 20th percentile of financial development, a 1 standard deviation decrease in firm size is associated with a decrease of 0.7 standard deviations in R\&D spending. In contrast, this decrease is only 0.2 standard deviations in a country like South Africa, which is at the 80th percentile of the distribution of financial development. Small firms also report producing more innovations per unit R\&D spending than large firms, and this gap is narrower in countries at higher levels of financial development. As a robustness check, the author shows that these patterns are stronger in industries inherently more reliant on external finance. Full document. Slide summary.
When do Creditor Rights Work?
Authors: Mehnaz Safavian and Siddharth Sharma
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4296 August 2007
Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with more credit to the private sector and deeper financial markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but the association between creditor rights and bank credit is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact that creditor rights change over time, the authors show that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong complements. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4296 August 2007
Creditor-friendly laws are generally associated with more credit to the private sector and deeper financial markets. But laws mean little if they are not upheld in the courts. The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of creditor rights is strongly linked to the efficiency of contract enforcement. This hypothesis is tested using firm level data on 27 European countries in 2002 and 2005. The analysis finds that firms have more access to bank credit in countries with better creditor rights, but the association between creditor rights and bank credit is much weaker in countries with inefficient courts. Exploiting the panel dimension of the data and the fact that creditor rights change over time, the authors show that the effect of a change in creditor rights on change in bank credit increases with court enforcement. In particular, a unit increase in the creditor rights index will increase the share of bank loans in firm investment by 27 percent in a country at the 10th percentile of the enforcement time distribution (Lithuania). However, the increase will be only 7 percent in a country at the 80th percentile of this distribution (Kyrgyzstan). Legal protections of creditors and efficient courts are strong complements. Full document. Slide summary.
Entry Regulation and Business Start-Ups: Evidence from Mexico
Authors: David S. Kaplan, Eduardo Piedra, Enrique Seira
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4322 August 2007
The authors estimate the effect on business start-ups of a program that significantly speeds up firm registration procedures. The program was implemented in Mexico in different municipalities at different dates. Authors estimates suggest that new start-ups increased by about 4 percent in eligible industries, and the authors present evidence that this is a causal effect. Most of the effect is temporary, concentrated in the first 10 months after implementation. The effect is robust to several specifications of the benchmark control group time trends. The authors find that the program was more effective in municipalities with less corruption and cheaper additional procedures. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4322 August 2007
The authors estimate the effect on business start-ups of a program that significantly speeds up firm registration procedures. The program was implemented in Mexico in different municipalities at different dates. Authors estimates suggest that new start-ups increased by about 4 percent in eligible industries, and the authors present evidence that this is a causal effect. Most of the effect is temporary, concentrated in the first 10 months after implementation. The effect is robust to several specifications of the benchmark control group time trends. The authors find that the program was more effective in municipalities with less corruption and cheaper additional procedures. Full document. Slide summary.
Labor Regulation and Employment in India's Retail Stores
Author: Mohammad Amin
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4314 August 2007
A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India compiled by the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys shows that 27 percent of the stores report labor regulations as a problem for their business. Using these data we analyze the effect of labor regulation on employment at the store level. The authors find that stricter labor regulation has a strong negative effect on employment. The authors estimates show that labor reforms are likely to increase employment by 22 percent of the current level for an average store. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4314 August 2007
A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India compiled by the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys shows that 27 percent of the stores report labor regulations as a problem for their business. Using these data we analyze the effect of labor regulation on employment at the store level. The authors find that stricter labor regulation has a strong negative effect on employment. The authors estimates show that labor reforms are likely to increase employment by 22 percent of the current level for an average store. Full document. Slide summary.
Computer Usage and Labor Regulation in India’s Retail Stores
Author: Mohammad Amin
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank’s Enterprise surveys shows that 19 percent of all stores use computers. In the state of Kerala, the figure is as high as 40 percent. Using this survey, the author estimates the effect of computer usage on labor employment. The analysis show that this effect depends on the stringency of the underlying labor laws. Stricter labor laws magnify the labor displacing effect of computers significantly. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank’s Enterprise surveys shows that 19 percent of all stores use computers. In the state of Kerala, the figure is as high as 40 percent. Using this survey, the author estimates the effect of computer usage on labor employment. The analysis show that this effect depends on the stringency of the underlying labor laws. Stricter labor laws magnify the labor displacing effect of computers significantly. Full document. Slide summary.
Competition and Labor Productivity in India’s Retail Stores
Author: Mohammad Amin
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
The paper analyzes the effect of product market competition on the average productivity of labor in India’s retail sector. The authors use a new dataset of 1,948 retail stores located in 41 cities of India compiled by the World Bank’s Enterprise surveys. According to the survey, 62% of the stores do not face any significant competition. The empirical analysis establishes a strong causal effect of competition on labor productivity of stores. Our estimates suggest an increase of 87% in labor productivity from pro-competitive reforms. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, August 2007
The paper analyzes the effect of product market competition on the average productivity of labor in India’s retail sector. The authors use a new dataset of 1,948 retail stores located in 41 cities of India compiled by the World Bank’s Enterprise surveys. According to the survey, 62% of the stores do not face any significant competition. The empirical analysis establishes a strong causal effect of competition on labor productivity of stores. Our estimates suggest an increase of 87% in labor productivity from pro-competitive reforms. Full document. Slide summary.
When do Enterprises Prefer Informal Credit?
Author: Mehnaz Safavian and Joshua Wimpey
Source: The World Bank, July 2007
The authors tested the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. The hypothesis is tested using enterprise level data on 3564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this sample, enterprises finance approximately 57% of their working capital requirements with external finance. This external finance comes from formal sources, such as commercial banks (53%) and informal sources (42%), such as trade creditors, or family and friends. In the sample, 14% of enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. The analysis shows that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax administration and overall governance. For example, it is that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes by tax inspectors, it is 17% more likely to prefer informal finance. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, July 2007
The authors tested the hypothesis that enterprises may forgo formal finance in lieu of informal credit by choice. They do so to avoid the additional regulatory scrutiny and harassment that engaging with the formal financial sector invites. The hypothesis is tested using enterprise level data on 3564 enterprises in 29 countries. In this sample, enterprises finance approximately 57% of their working capital requirements with external finance. This external finance comes from formal sources, such as commercial banks (53%) and informal sources (42%), such as trade creditors, or family and friends. In the sample, 14% of enterprises rely exclusively on informal finance. The analysis shows that the likelihood of enterprises preferring to only use informal finance is inversely related to the quality of the regulatory environment, particularly the quality of tax administration and overall governance. For example, it is that when an enterprise has been asked for bribes by tax inspectors, it is 17% more likely to prefer informal finance. Full document. Slide summary.
Are Labor Regulations Driving Computer Usage in India’s Retail Stores?
Author: Mohammad Amin
Source: The World Bank, July 2007
A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys shows that 19 percent of the stores use computers for their business. In some states like Kerala, computer usage is as high as 40 percent. Using this data we find labor regulation as an important determinant of computer usage. The estimates suggest that when faced with burdensome labor regulations, the probability of using a computer rises by over 36 percentage points for an average store. These findings formally confirm a commonly held but untested view that labor regulation may be responsible for the spread of labor saving modern technology. Full document. Slide summary.
Source: The World Bank, July 2007
A recent survey of 1,948 retail stores in India conducted by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys shows that 19 percent of the stores use computers for their business. In some states like Kerala, computer usage is as high as 40 percent. Using this data we find labor regulation as an important determinant of computer usage. The estimates suggest that when faced with burdensome labor regulations, the probability of using a computer rises by over 36 percentage points for an average store. These findings formally confirm a commonly held but untested view that labor regulation may be responsible for the spread of labor saving modern technology. Full document. Slide summary.
The Persistence of Corruption in Brazil
Author: Rita Ramalho
Source: The World Bank, January 16, 2007
Corruption imposes substantial economic costs, yet there is little evidence on the success of anti-corruption campaigns. The author studied the 1992 impeachment of president Collor in Brazil to evaluate its impact on politically connected companies both in the short- and long-term. Using an event study methodology, the short-run effect is established: family-connected firms on average lose 2 to 9 percentage points of their value on dates when information damaging to the impeached president is released. However, this decline is reversed entirely within one year. The author concludes that the impeachment had limited success in reducing corruption in Brazil. Full document.
Source: The World Bank, January 16, 2007
Corruption imposes substantial economic costs, yet there is little evidence on the success of anti-corruption campaigns. The author studied the 1992 impeachment of president Collor in Brazil to evaluate its impact on politically connected companies both in the short- and long-term. Using an event study methodology, the short-run effect is established: family-connected firms on average lose 2 to 9 percentage points of their value on dates when information damaging to the impeached president is released. However, this decline is reversed entirely within one year. The author concludes that the impeachment had limited success in reducing corruption in Brazil. Full document.